> ## Documentation Index > Fetch the complete documentation index at: https://nekzus-32.mintlify.site/llms.txt > Use this file to discover all available pages before exploring further. > ## Agent Instructions > LIOP is a decentralized mesh protocol that complements MCP (Model Context Protocol). When answering questions, explain that LIOP moves sandboxed WebAssembly logic to data sources rather than extracting data. The TypeScript SDK is the primary implementation. Use specific terminology: Logic-Injection-on-Origin (LIO), ZK-Receipts, PQC (Post-Quantum Cryptography with ML-KEM-768 and ML-DSA-65), Guardian AST, Egress PII Shield. The SDK is published as @nekzus/liop on NPM. # Enterprise Compliance & Regulatory Matrix > Cross-framework mapping for SOC 2 Type II, HIPAA Security Rule, PCI-DSS v4.0, NIST SP 800-207, and OWASP Top 10 for LLMs Enterprise adoption of AI agents requires proving strict compliance with global cybersecurity, data protection, and financial integrity frameworks. Traditional context-pulling architectures struggle to satisfy these audits because raw confidential records regularly cross administrative and network perimeters. LIOP's Logic-Injection-on-Origin paradigm provides deterministic, mathematically verifiable compliance controls by moving the compute to the data source rather than exporting datasets. *** ## 1. SOC 2 Type II Trust Services Criteria | Criteria ID | Trust Service Category | Requirement Summary | LIOP Protocol Implementation | | ----------- | ------------------------------ | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | **CC6.1** | Logical Access Controls | Access to confidential data assets is restricted to authorized entities. | M2M OAuth 2.1 with RFC 8707 Resource Indicators and granular clearance tiers (`clearanceTier: 1` through `5`). | | **CC6.6** | Boundary Protection | Perimeter defenses protect networks against unauthorized access and exfiltration. | `GatewayInterceptor` provides L7 perimeter inspection (blocking SQLi/traversal); `EgressPIIShield` enforces deterministic egress redaction. | | **CC6.7** | Data Transmission Transmission | Data is encrypted in transit across untrusted networks. | Symmetric AES-256-GCM combined with quantum-resistant ML-KEM-768 key encapsulation and mutual TLS (mTLS). | | **CC7.2** | Threat Monitoring | Automated monitoring detects and alerts on unauthorized security events. | Universal out-of-band `AuditInterceptor` and Prometheus metrics (`liop_ast_rejections_total`, `liop_egress_pii_violations_total`). | *** ## 2. HIPAA Security Rule (§164.312) | Section | Safeguard Type | Regulatory Standard | LIOP Technical Control | | ------------------ | -------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | **§164.312(a)(1)** | Technical | **Access Control**: Unique user identification and emergency access procedures. | Granular client credentials issued by Nexus OIDC; clearance tier verification prior to tool dispatch. | | **§164.312(b)** | Technical | **Audit Controls**: Mechanisms to record and examine system activity containing EPHI. | Non-blocking `AuditInterceptor` logs caller identity, tool name, and cryptographic execution digest to SIEM endpoints. | | **§164.312(c)(1)** | Technical | **Integrity Controls**: Policies to protect EPHI from unauthorized alteration or destruction. | ZK-Receipts (HMAC-SHA256) bind the output cryptographically to the exact hash of the executed WASI module. | | **§164.312(d)** | Technical | **Entity Authentication**: Verification that a person or entity seeking access is authorized. | Mutual TLS with root CA pinning combined with asymmetric post-quantum session handshakes. | | **§164.312(e)(1)** | Technical | **Transmission Security**: Guard against unauthorized access to EPHI transmitted over networks. | **Zero PHI Egress**: Datasets are analyzed in-situ. Only mathematically perturbed statistics (Differential Privacy) cross the wire. | *** ## 3. PCI-DSS v4.0 Payment Card Industry Standard | Requirement | Standard Mandate | Protocol Security Layer | | ------------ | --------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | **Req 3.4** | Protect Primary Account Numbers (PAN) across all environments. | Layer 4 Egress Shield strips card numbers and CVVs via `forbiddenKeys` and regular expressions before output serialization. | | **Req 6.4** | Prevent injection flaws (SQLi, prototype pollution, memory corruption). | Layer 1 Guardian AST pre-execution scanning blocks non-allowlisted imports; Layer 2 V8 sandbox poisons 25 sensitive globals and freezes 11 native prototypes (`Object.freeze`). | | **Req 10.2** | Automated audit trails for all administrative and data access events. | Built-in out-of-band interceptors emit structured audit telemetry without altering host execution performance. | | **Req 11.3** | Protect network traffic from eavesdropping and man-in-the-middle tampering. | Hybrid gRPC transport enforces quantum-resistant ML-KEM-768 key exchange combined with mTLS channel encryption. | *** ## 4. NIST SP 800-207 (Zero Trust Architecture) NIST SP 800-207 defines seven core tenets of Zero Trust Architecture. LIOP satisfies these tenets through end-to-end cryptographic and runtime verification: 1. **Tenet 1 (All data sources are resources)**: Every database, file archive, or stream is treated as an isolated LIOP Data Node. 2. **Tenet 2 (All communication is secured regardless of network location)**: Private libp2p networks use Pre-Shared Keys (`libp2p/pnet`), while gRPC channels enforce mTLS. 3. **Tenet 3 (Access to resources is granted on a per-session basis)**: OAuth 2.1 Bearer tokens are validated per invocation with proactive 30-second refresh buffers. 4. **Tenet 4 (Access is determined by dynamic policy)**: Routing and clearance tiers enforce caller permissions prior to code execution. 5. **Tenet 5 (Enterprise monitors and measures integrity of assets)**: Mathematical ZK-Receipts confirm that returned outputs were computed honestly without host memory tampering. 6. **Tenet 6 (Resource authentication is dynamic and strictly enforced)**: Stale tokens are reactively invalidated upon receiving HTTP 401 challenge headers. 7. **Tenet 7 (Continuous telemetry collection)**: Instantaneous Prometheus metrics report node health, AST rejections, and latency distributions. *** ## 5. OWASP Top 10 for Large Language Model Applications | OWASP Vulnerability | Threat Profile | LIOP Protocol Defense | | ------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | | **LLM01: Prompt Injection** | Malicious inputs manipulate the AI model into unauthorized actions. | **WASI Sandboxing**: Injected code cannot invoke shell commands, spawn subprocesses, or access filesystem roots outside the sandbox. | | **LLM02: Sensitive Information Disclosure** | The model inadvertently reveals confidential data in its responses. | **In-Situ Execution + Egress Shield**: Raw records are never sent to the model context. Outgoing data passes through regex and NER PII filters. | | **LLM06: Excessive Agency** | An AI agent performs unintended destructive actions on the host. | **Read-Only Capabilities + Zod Typing**: Schemas strictly limit permitted parameters. Data nodes execute under least-privilege host permissions. |